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GERMANY'S INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION:
THE RULINGS OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ON THE MAASTRICHT
TREATY AND THE OUT-OF-AREA DEPLOYMENT
OF GERMAN TROOPS
Manfred H. WiegandC

INTRODUCTION

In both 1993 and 1994, within nine months of each other, the Second
Chamber' of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) in
Karlsruhe delivered two eagerly expected and highly important judgments that clarified Germany's position in the international community.

In the first judgment of October 12, 1993, the Court decided that the
obligations Germany entered into with its signing of the Maastricht
Treaty on European Union (TEU)3 did not violate the German Constitu-

* Dr. iur. (Ph.D.), University of Gottingen; M.A.L.D.. The Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy.
1. The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericho is split into two
chambers (Senate), each consisting of eight justices. Article 14 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz) determines which chamber is in
charge of a case. Most cases on matters of foreign policy fall within the competence
of the Second Chamber.
2. 2 BvR 2134/92, 2159/92, reprinted in 1993 NEUE JURISTrSCIIE
WocHElscHmiFr (NJ.W.) 3047 (extracts), translated in [19941 1 C.M.LR. 57 (Brunner v. European Union Treaty). The decision has meanwhile also been published in
89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVcrfGE 155. The translation of
this case contained in the Common Market Law Reports does not always accurately
interpret the FCC's special emphasis on describing the European Union as something
different from a conventional governmental organization, but not yet a supranational
organization with its own sovereign rights independent from its Member States. The
author therefore relies on his own translation where necessary. For another liberal
translation of this case, see 33 I.L.M. 388 (1994).
3. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 2, 1992, 1992 OJ. (C 1991) 109. [19921 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEUI. For an English text of the EEC Treaty as modified
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tion and thereby removed the last obstacle for the ratification of the
Treaty. With the deposit of the German instrument of ratification, the
Maastricht Treaty, which provides a basis for the extended integration of
the Community of originally twelve and currently fifteen European states
now called the European Union (EU), could enter into force.
The second judgment, delivered on July 12, 1994,' concerned the deployment of German troops for peace-keeping missions in Somalia and
the former Yugoslavia pursuant to United Nations (UN) Security Council
resolutions. Commentators widely regard the decision as giving the
green light for Germany's military engagement in such peace-keeping
efforts, and therefore, as providing a basis for the assignment of a more
important role in post-Cold War world politics to re-united Germany.
The major impact these judgments may have on Germany's international
status and its future foreign policy in general warrants an analysis of
both rulings.
I. THE MAASTRICHT RULING
A. THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT
In the Maastricht case, the German Federal Constitutional Court, in
deciding an individual constitutional complaint about the violation of
voting rights, considered whether the German Constitution permitted the
transfer of essential competencies from the Bundestag5 to the European
Union, as provided under the TEU, or whether this violated the democratic principle embodied in Article 206 of the German Basic Law

by the TEU see, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573.
4. 2 ByE 3/92, 5/93, 7/93, 8/93, reprinted in 1994 EUROPISCHE GRUNDREcHTE
ZEITSCHRIFT [EuGRZ] 281; 1994 N.J.W. 2207 (extracts).
5. The author uses the term "parliament" for the German Bundestag. AngloAmerican writings often apply the term "Lower House" to the Bundestag, and "Upper
House" to the second legislative federal organ, the Bundesrat, in which the linder
(state) governments are represented. This terminology, however, is derived from the
English system and insufficiently reflects the status of these organs under the German
Constitution.
6. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 20, translated in BASIC LAW FOR THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 22 (Press and Information Office of the Federal
Governmented., 1994) [hereinafter 001. Article 20 of the German Constitution provides:
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany shall be a democratic and social federal
state. (2) All public authority emanates from the people. It shall be exercised
by the people through elections and referendums and by special legislative,
executive, and judicial bodies. (3) The legislature shall be bound by the consti-
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(Grundgesetz). While the democratic principle primarily serves to reaffirm the democratic character of the German Federal State, it also influences the scope of citizens' voting rights under Article 38(1). Even
though the newly amended Article 23 specifically authorizes the Federation to transfer sovereign rights to the European Union, a possible
violation of the German Constitution was still an issue because Article
79(3),8

in conjunction with Article 20, declares any constitutional

amendment that infringes on the democratic principle inadmissible.
Hence the Maastricht complaint asked the Second Chamber of the FCC
to answer a basic question of national sovereignty in the broader context
of European integration.
The Maastricht opinion was not the first time that the FCC made
fundamental statements about the relationship between Community and
German Constitutional law, and thereby defined Germany's borderline
between European integration and national sovereignty. As early as
1974, the FCC questioned the supremacy of European Community law
over German constitutional law in the human rights area. In a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EEC (European Economic Community) Treaty, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that national
courts could not review community law under their national constitutional law.9 Thereafter, in response to the ECJ ruling, the FCC, in its socalled Solange I decision," ascertained that the FCC had the power to
review alleged human rights violations by European instruments "as long
as" the European integration process had not led to a catalogue of fundamental rights under community law "adequate in comparison" with the
fundamental rights contained in the German Constitution." In a conflict
tutional order, the executive and judiciary by law and justice.
Id.

7. GG, supra note 6, art. 38(1). Article 38(1) of the German Constitution states
that "members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free,
equal and secret elections. They shall be representatives of the whole people; they
shall not be bound by instructions, only by their conscience." Id.
8. Id. art. 79(3). Article 79(3) of the German Constitution provides that
"[a]mendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Under,
their participation in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles I
and 20 shall be prohibited." Id. This is the so-called "eternity guarantee."
9. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und
Vorratstelle fir Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, translared in [19721 1
C.M.L.R. 255.
10. Judgment of May 29, 1974, 37 BverfGE 271 translared in [19741 2 C.M.LR.
540. In English "solange" means "as long [as]."
11. Id. at 554.
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between European norms and fundamental rights under the German
Basic Law, the FCC found, the latter had to prevail." Twelve years
later, the FCC revised the Solange I decision in a ruling known as
Solange I.
In view of prior ECJ decisions, especially in the Nold"4 and

Hauer 5 cases, which recognized that fundamental rights were an integral element of the legal order of the Community, the FCC in Solange
H announced that it would "no longer exercise its jurisdiction to decide
on the applicability of secondary Community legislation" as the legal
basis for acts within the "sovereign jurisdiction" of the Federal Republic,
at least as long as the Community safeguarded the "essential content of
fundamental rights" regarded "as substantially similar" to the rights
"unconditionally" protected by the German constitution. 6 The Court's
language, however, revealed that the FCC did not renounce its own

jurisdiction, but only chose a procedural solution to the problem of
conflicting jurisdictions. Soon thereafter legal commentators called for a
clarifying Solange III judgment. 7
B.

THE REASONING OF THE COURT

In the Maastricht decision, the FCC construed the voting rights provision of Article 38(1) of the German Constitution, which formed the
legal basis for the constitutional complaint in this case, in manner similar to that of the complainant (Beschwerdeftihrer).8 Finding first that

12. Id. at 550-51 (noting that the fundamental rights under the German Constitution must prevail as long as the Community has not removed the conflict between
Community law and part of the guarantees of fundamental rights in the German Constitution).
13. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, 73 BVerfGE 339, translated in [1987] 3
C.M.L.R. 225 (In Re the Application of Wfinsche Handelsgesellschaft).
14. Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, reprinted in 2 C.M.L.R.
338 (1974).
15. Case 4479, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3227, reprinted in 3
C.M.L.R. 42 (1979).
16. [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 225, 265 (emphasis added).
17. See Rupert Scholz, Wie lange bis "Solange II!"?, 1990 N.J.W. 941, 943-46
(1990) (noting that the FCC has not provided adequate guidelines for resolving conflicts between Community and national law, and finding that a Solange III decision is
necessary for this purpose).
18. [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 72 (summarizing the complainant's argument that
insufficient democracy at the Community level violates Article 38 of the German
Constitution); see also id. at 76-78 (discussing the merits of the complainant's allegations that the Maastricht Treaty violates the complainant's rights under Article 38(l)
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Article 38(1) extends to the democratic content of the electoral right,
which includes the right of the German people to cooperate in the legitimation of state power, and second that this democratic principle is affected when the Bundestag relinquishes its legislative and controlling
powers, 9 the FCC thereby opened for itself the possibility of scrutiniz-

ing whether the Treaty on European Union complies with the democratic
principle as embodied in the German Basic Law?' The court declared
that the allegation that the transfer of sovereign powers to the EU would
likely diminish the basic rights protection of German citizens was inad-

missible. The Court principally confirmed its Solange II decision by
finding that the FCC still guarantees the applicability of basic rights
protection to inhabitants "by its jurisdiction," but it exercises this power

to review secondary Community law in a "relationship of cooperation"
(Kooperationsverhiiltnis)with the ECJ. While the ECJ guarantees basic

rights protection in any particular case for the whole territory of the
European Communities, the FCC restricts itself to a "general guarantee
of indispensable (unabdingbare) basic rights standards." 2' The language
of the Court reveals a slight, but noteworthy change with respect to
former rulings. By declaring that the FCC provides protection of basic

rights "in Germany-in this respect not merely as against German state
bodies" and by explicitly mentioning that it overrules its Eurocontrol

of the German Constitution and noting that this allegation was the only admissible
constitutional complaint in this case). The only complaint challenging the Maastricht
treaty, which the FCC found partly admissible and reviewed on the merits, was that
of a former high-ranking EC official. Id. at 72.
19. Id. at 77.
20. See, e.g., Volkmar Gotz, Das aastricht-Urteildes Bundesverfassungsgerichts,
1993 JURISTENZEITUNG 1081, 1082 (remarking that the Court found its way to the
merits through an "eye of a needle" and that sole reliance on Article 38(1) of the
Basic Law, which only speaks of the citizens' right to elect the Parliament, as an
individual right that may potentially hinder shifting competencies from the Parliament
to other organs, may cause problems by limiting the Court to a legislative analysis of
German constitutional law while leaving Community law, or the effect of German
constitutional law on community law, outside the scope of the decision): Christian
Tomuschat, Die Europdische Union unter der Aufsicht des Bundesverfassungsgerichis.
1993 EuGRZ 489, 491 (pointing out that the legal argument that a German citizen
has the right, beyond his or her voting right, to demand that the German Bundestag
retain substantial decision-making authority leads to an actio popularis that was certainly not envisaged by the Court); Hans Peter Ipsen, Zen Glossen zin MaastrichtUrteil, 1994 Europarecht I (making a similar argument). But see Judgment of Jan. 1I,
1983, 62 BverfGE 397, 399 (denying construction of Article 38 as containing an individual right that can be violated by parliamentary measures).
21. [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 79 (emphasis added and translation slightly modified).
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decision, - the Court seems willing to redeem part of its jurisdiction in
the human rights area. The Maastricht ruling is thus more restrictive regarding the subsidiarity of the Court's basic rights protection.' In
practice, this statement will have no major impact because only those
cases in which the ECJ cannot provide human rights protection for
procedural reasons, and where the European justices do not recognize a
fundamental right guaranteed under German law, might qualify for subsidiary protection by the German High Court.24 It is surprising though
that the FCC apparently places less trust in the protection of human
rights by the ECJ at a time when the Treaty on European Union, with
Article F(2), sets the human rights standards in the member states as an
orientation mark for the community standard of human rights protection.' Commentators, however, should not overestimate the practical
impact of this move. It remains to be seen whether the FCC will attempt to exercise the functions of a super appeal entity in the human
rights field.26
The FCC further ruled inadmissible any challenges to the second and
third pillars of the Maastricht Treaty concerning cooperation in security,
justice, and home affairs, because in the court's view these matters do
not have immediate supranational effects. According to the FCC justices, further action in such areas requires separate agreements. Thus,
basic rights violations arising out of the implementation of such agreements may constitute a new basis for proceedings before the ECJ or the
FCC.29

22. Id. at 79 n.15; see Judgment of June 23, 1981, 58 BverfG 1, 27 (stating that
German courts have no "buffer" competence should legal protection against international institutions be inadequate).
23. See Gltz, supra note 20, at 1083 (noting that the Maastricht decision limits
the FCC's competence with respect to European human rights protection).
24. Id. at 1083.
25. See Tomuschat, supra note 20, at 490 (noting that the FCC should have
recognized the, to date, progressed consolidation of human rights protection and expanded the scope of its Solange I decision particularly in light of the passage of
Article F(2)).
26. See Meinhard Schr6der, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als Hilter des Staates
im Prozefl der europtiischen Integration-Bemerkungen zum Maastricht-Urteil, 1994
DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 316, 323 (noting that future case law will determine
the extent to which the FCC will make itself into the ultimate guarantor of human
rights in the EU).
27. See [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 80-82.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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On the merits of their unanimous decision on the Maastricht Treaty,
the justices made a general statement about the openness of the German
constitution for supranational integration. Even though Article 79(3)
declares that the democratic principle is inalienable, this does not mean,
as the Chamber points out, that the "people" (Staatsvolk) must produce
the legitimation of state power on the supranational level in the same
way as on the national level. Delegation of powers to a supranational
organization, as already insinuated by the Basic Law itself in Articles
23, 24, and the preamble, necessarily entails that the exercise of these
powers no longer depends on the will of one state alone. The supranational community finds its democratic legitimation in the national legislative act assenting the accession to that community. The inalienable
democratic principle of the German Basic Law only requires "that the
legitimation and influence which derives from the people will be preserved" in the "compound of states" (Staatenverbund). 0 The Court,
however, indicates that delegation of even more sovereign powers to the

30. Id. at 86. The translation uses the term "federation of States" for
"Staatenverbund." This author believes that a literal translation of this term is neces-

sary to reflect that the FCC, by using the word "Staatenverbund" instead of
"Staatenbund" apparently infers that it views the EU as less than a federation, but
also different than an alliance of states. See Matthias Herdegen, Maastricht and the
German Constitutional Court: Constitutional Restraints for an "Ever Closer Union".

31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 235, 236 (1994) (using the term "compound" as well).
The choice of the term "Staatenverbund" originated in earlier works of the reporter in
this case. See, e.g., Justice Paul Kirchhof, Der deutsche Staat im Prozefl der
europilischen Integration in 7 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTSr DiR

BUNDESR U.BLIK

DEUTSCHLAND 855, 879 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchenhof eds., 1992) (discussing the
establishment of a "Staatenverbund"); Tomuschat, supra note 20, at 491-92 (suggesting
that this term was chosen because it has not yet been dogmatically employed);
Schr6der, supra note 26, at 320 (regarding the term as adequate because it reflects
the status of European integration as a union still based on the sovereignty of the
Member States); Albrecht Weber, Die Wirtschafisund Wlihrungsunion nach den:
Maastricht-Urteil des BVerfG, 1994 JUR1STNZatNG 53. 58 (stating that the term is

meant to express that the Community more closely resembles a confederation than a
supranational body). But see Ipsen, supra note 20, at 8, 21 (recommending against
use of the term since, in the past, the term had a distinct meaning in the economic
field). The Court's attempt to find a term specifically tailored for the European Union, and the scrutiny with which German scholars look at the term, resembles the
German conceptional jurisprudence (Begriffsjurispruden:) dominant in the 19th century.
Instead of looking for the right conceptional term for European integration, legal
experts on this topic would do better spending their energy analyzing more thoroughly
the contents of the treaties as the legal basis of integration. If these scholars need a
term, they could easily take it from the TEU itself and call the structure a "union."
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EU would require the strengthening of the democratic basis of the EU
itself. Momentarily it is still the (European) "peoples" (Staatsvdlker),
through their national parliaments, that convey democratic legitimation to
the EU: "Each of the peoples of the individual States is the starting
point for a power relating to that people." (Jedes der Staatsvdilker ist
Ausgangspunkt ffir eine auf es selbst bezogene Staatsgewalt.) The FCC
emphasizes that the democratic principle requires each people to "develop and articulate itself in a process of political will-formation which it
legitimates and controls, in order thus to give legal expression to what
unites (verbindet) the people ... (to a greater or lesser degree of homogeneity) spiritually, socially and politically." The Court thereby expresses
its opinion that the "European people," as the basis for a "European
state," still lacks the necessary degree of homogeneity. The Chamber
concludes that the German Bundestag, therefore, must retain "functions
and powers of substantial importance."'" The FCC's insinuation about
the lack of homogeneity of the European people can be looked at from
two different angles. On the one hand, one may understand the FCC's
viewpoint in a pro-integrationist way, i.e. once the European citizenry
becomes more homogeneous, there will be a possibility of legitimizing
the community powers through a European electorate. On the other
hand, one may also interpret it more pessimistically as an indication of
the FCC's belief that the achievement of such homogeneity is not likely
in the near future. The majority of German scholars have adopted the
latter interpretation."

31. [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. at 88-89 (translating "verbindet" as "binds together").
"Unite," however, seems to be the more appropriate translation. This becomes clear
when analyzing the writing of Hermann Heller, to which the FCC refers to in the
Maastricht decision. Id. at 88 n.23; see Hermann Heller, Politische Demokratie und
soziale Homogenitdt, in 2 GESAMMELTE SCHRIFrEN 421, 427 (Christoph Moller &
Martin Drath eds., 1971) (addressing the problem of national "unity" (Einheit)).
32. See, e.g., G6tz, supra note 20, at 1082 (finding that the judgment is based
on the principle of the last responsibility of the state); Herdegen, supra note 30, at
235-36 (noting that the Maastricht case recognizes "rather dramatic restraints upon the
future development of the European Union" by its members and complaining about
the Court's "rather static" concept of statehood that is unsuitable for European integration); Dominique Hanf, Le jugement de la Cour constitutionellefedirale allemande
sur la constitutionnalit du Traitj de Maastricht. Un nouveau chapitre des relations
entre le droit communautaire et le droit national, 1994 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE
DROIT EUROPIEN 391, 417 (noting that the German justices do not appear to believe

in the possibility of enhancing the competencies of the European Parliament); lpsen,
supra note 20, at 7 (viewing the "Europeanization" of a European people very skeptically); Karl M. Meessen, Maastricht nach Karlsruhe, 1994 N.J.W. 549, 549-54 (claim-
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The latter view may not be entirely warranted. This part of the judg-

ment is distinguishable from other parts, to be discussed below, that are
much less integration-friendly. Even though the FCC states that the

national parliaments of the individual member states convey democratic
legitimacy to the EU, the FCC at the same time moderates this statement by inserting in parenthesis "as [is true] at present."33 The Court

also insinuates that some of the conditions for the development of a
European public opinion already exist, while others may be developed

within the framework of the European Union.'

The conditions the

Court mentions, such as transparency of the decision-making process and

the possibility of communicating with the sovereign power in the sovereign's own language," are indispensable for democratic legitimacy and
to a far extent do not yet exist at the European level. When the Court

emphasizes that "[a]lready at the present stage of development the legitimation provided by the European Parliament has a supporting function,

which could become stronger if it were to be elected by equivalent electoral rules in all the member States,"' it does not raise the stakes any
higher but merely contemplates that the process of gaining democratic
legitimacy is a dynamic and interactive one. In these passages, the
Court's judgment is far more a comment on the democratic deficit of

ing that the principle of compensation should be as valid for democratic legitimation
as it is for human rights protection, and arguing that the Court opposes further integration because there is no such thing as a European people under the Court's anachronistic view of statehood); Schrdler, supra note 26, at 318-19 (emphasizing that one
cannot regard the European Parliament as a full democratic body and noting that this
is a problem of the democratic legitimatiqji of European integration through the national parliaments); Tomuschat, supra note 20. at 494 (arguing that the "eternity guarantee" of Article 79(3) of the Basic Law should not be regarded as an obstacle to
European integration envisaged in the Constitution itself, and commenting that the
Maastricht judgment has the effect of slowing down the process).
33. [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 88.
34. Il at 87.
35. Id
36. Id; see Carl Otto Lenz, Der Vertrag von Maastricht nach dem Urteil des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 1993 NJ.W. 3038. 3039 (pointing out the positive role the
Court ascribes to the European Parliament in the integration process): see also
Schr6der, supra note 26, at 325 (commenting on the positive light in which the Court
refers to the European Parliament and noting that the strengthening of parliamentary
powers would deprive the EU of legitimation through the national parliaments).
Schroder, however, is only correct if the process of strengthening the European Parliament is not also accompanied by a strengthening of the democratic environment in
Europe with an aim toward shaping a European people.
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the EU than some commentators realize. Nevertheless, it is correct to
say that the decision's emphasis is not on this point. 7
According to the justices, since at present the EU is not a European
state but merely a "compound of states" (Staatenverbund), the EU's
status as a European state remains dependent upon the authorization of
the sovereign states.38 In Germany, the Bundestag exercises the sovereign power to decide on the membership to and the further development
of the EU. According to the Court, the democratic principle requires that
the German people must be in a position to influence the exercise of
sovereign power through elections to the federal parliament. Hence, a
law transferring powers to supranational communities has to lay down
the rights it transfers and the "intended program of integration"
(beabsichtigtes Integrationsprogramm) with "sufficient
certainty"
(hinreichend bestimmbar). Thus, the German parliament is impeded from
conferring on the EU a "general enablement" (Generalermachtigung)."
The Court regards the transfer of power from the German Parliament to
European institutions as somewhat comparable to the parliamentary
authorization of the German government to issue decrees, which has
similar limitations under Article 80(1) of the Basic Law. However, the
FCC explicitly stresses that the requirements as to precision of such
authorization in the international field cannot be as strict as on the national level.'
The Court's approach to the problem of democratic legitimacy of EU
acts may seem convincing at first glance, but it neglects another facet of
democratic legitimation-that of democratic control. Even though legislators have enhanced the Bundestag's rights toward the German government through the newly created "Europe" Article 23 of the German
Constitution, the Bundestag is not oable to exercise democratic control
over the entire legislative process in the Community. Only a European
Parliament is able to fulfill this task.4 The FCC approaches the problem of democratic legitimacy of EU acts from the angle of the certainty

37. Gbtz, supra note 20, at 1082 (noting that the structure of the EU and the
impact of German law on such structure is not the primary focus of the Court's
opinion).
38. [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 88. The translated text again incorrectly refers to a
"federation of states" and not "compound of states." See supra note 30 (describing
this distinction).
39. Id. at 88-89.
40. Id. at 89.
41. To date, this problem has not been addressed by many commentators. For
one commentator's analysis of this problem, see Hanf, supra note 32, at 420.
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of the national parliaments authorization of the Community. This approach cannot grasp the issue of democratic legitimacy entirely, as is revealed by the Court's struggle to justify the legitimacy of the majority
principle on the European level.42
Based on the premise that democratic legitimacy on the European
level is derived from the empowerment of the Community by the national parliaments, the Court reaches a conclusion that limits the supranational powers of the EU in a substantial way. Primarily, the FCC proposes to review "legal instruments" of European institutions or agencies
to determine whether such instruments remain within the limits of the
sovereign rights conferred on them.43
Most commentators have criticized this formula. First, commentators
argue that the FCC has placed itself in a position of a super appeal
entity for Community acts and ignores the exclusive jurisdiction of the
ECJ to decide whether the Treaties cover acts of the European bodies or
whether those organs transgress their powers.' Second, commentators
42. [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 86. In this opinion, the FCC derives the legitimacy of
majority rule, not very convincingly, from the national act of accession. Id. It views
the "requirement of mutual consideration entailed by loyalty to the community"
(Gemeinschaftstreue) that makes the EU respect the "constitutional principles and basic
interests of the Member States" as moderating that principle. Id. Such vague limits
will probably not prevent the occurrence of Community acts in variance with the
democratic will of one or the other national parliament.
43. Id. at 89. The FCC states:
[I]f European institutions or agencies were to treat (lhandhaben) or develop
(fortbilden) the Union Treaty in a way that was no longer covered by the
Treaty in the form that is the basis for the Act of Accession
(Zustinunungsgesetz), the resultant legislative instruments would not be legally
binding within the sphere of German sovereignty (Hoheitsbereich). The German
state organs would be prevented for constitutional reasons from applying them
in Germany. Accordingly, the Federal Constitutional Court will review legal
instruments of European institutions and agencies to see whether they remain
within the limits of the sovereign rights conferred to them or transgress them.
ld.
44. See Meessen, supra note 32, at 552 (emphasizing that the FCC's claim of
final appellate power jeopardizes the judicial system of the EU); Schri~der, supra note
26, at 322-24 (providing a less harsh critique by pointing at the Court's lacking strategy for solving competence conflicts). Schrder argues that the preliminary ruling of
the ECJ should have priority according to Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. Id. at 324;
see also Weber, supra note 30, at 59 (indicating that the Court in its Maastricht
opinion failed to include a provision granting the EC primary responsibility for ensuring that the European institutions stay within their areas of competence). The answer to Weber's query is that the Court probably did not intend to provide such a
clarification and, thus, omitted it on purpose.
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note that the FCC's language is broad enough to concede the right of
non-recognition of EU ultra vires acts to all German authorities. If this
analysis is correct, the whole EU system would be placed in serious
jeopardy.45 On the other hand, the FCC may only want to accrue to itself a final right of judgment on the validity of EU decisions for Germany.46
The FCC's discussion of the compulsory effects of EU decisions is
not merely hypothetical, as is proven in the Court's further deliberations.
Even though the Chamber concludes that the delegation of sovereign
powers under the Maastricht Treaty does not violate the democratic
principle of the German constitution, 47 the FCC only reaches this conclusion by choosing an interpretation of the Treaty that conforms with
the German constitution (verfassungskonforme Auslegung). Under this
strict constructionist approach, the treaty provisions are deemed constitutional only if one follows the FCC's interpretation of the treaty. One
important point is the Court's interpretation of Article F(3) of the TEU,
which states that "The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry out its policies."'" The Karlsruhe
justices do not understand this provision as a "Kompetenz-Kompetenz"'9
that would give the EU the power to allocate competencies or financial
means in its own right. Rather, in their opinion the entire Treaty is
characterized by the "principle of restricted specific empowerment"
(Prinzip der begrenzten Einzelermdchtigung)." Towards the end of the
opinion, it becomes clear that this characterization is plainly a critique
of the way the ECJ has used to interpret the provisions of the EC treaties.5

45. See Tomuschat, supra note 20, at 494 (stating that failure to respect the
EJC's decisions jeopardizes the entire EU system).
46. See Ipsen, supra note 20, at I1 (interpreting the Court's language as limiting
to itself final appellate power concerning EU decisions affecting Germany).
47. [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 89.
48. TEU, supra note 3, art. F(3).
49. The translated opinion uses the words "power to extend its powers" for
Kompetenz-Kompetenz. In German legal doctrine, Kompetenz-Kompetenz more precisely
means the power to accrue competencies. See CARL ScHMITr, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE
386-87 (6th ed. 1983) (discussing the meaning of the term "Kompetenz-Kompetenz").
50. [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 95.
51. Id. at 105. The Court states:
Whereas a dynamic extension of the existing Treaties has so far been supported
on the basis of an open-handed treatment of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty as
a "competence to round-off the Treaty" as a whole, and on the basis of considerations relating to the "implied powers" of the Communities, and of Treaty
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Also relevant to the topic of European integration is the FCC's understanding of the procedure for creating a European monetary union. The
justices express the concern that the points laid down in the "Protocol
on the Convergence Criteria" may be "relaxed" (aufgeweich).52 Therefore, the Court interprets such convergence criteria narrowly and rejects
any "automatism" towards a monetary union. Even though Article 109
j(3) & (4) mandate a qualified majority decision of the European Council, consisting of the heads of governments of all member states, for
entering the third stage of the monetary union, in the Court's opinion
this requirement does not establish a right of the European Council to
detach itself from the criteria agreed on in the Protocol.' In an obiter
dictum, the FCC even mentions that failure to achieve the envisaged
"stability community" (Stabilititsgenzeinschaft) would, as tltima ratio,
even provide a basis for legitimizing leaving the "Community"
(Gemeinschaft).' Even though the context of this remark makes it quite
clear that the Court only means the monetary union, many scholars have
nevertheless emphasized that Germany does not have th'e right to withdraw from the European Community, respectively European Union,
because even national sovereignty does not convey the right to retreat
from obligations a state has voluntarily accepted.55 After Germany enters into the monetary union, its membership in the union becomes
irreversible under the respective Protocol signed without reservations by
Germany, and thus unilateral withdrawal is not possible.'

interpretation as allowing maximum exploitation of Community powers ("effet
utile"), in future it will have to be noted as regards interpretation of enabling
provisions by Community institutions and agencies that the Union Treaty as a
matter of principle distinguishes between the exercise of a sovereign power
conferred for limited purposes and the amending of the Treaty, so that its interpretation may not have effects that are equivalent to an extension of the Treaty.
Such an interpretation of enabling rules would not produce any binding effects
for Germany.
Md (footnotes omitted).
52. Id. at 100 (stating that the "convergence criteria" cannot be relaxed).
53. kd at 99-101 (placing special emphasis on the ability of the German Parliament to influence a final decision on Germany's entrance into the monetary union).
54. [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 101 (stating that if a "community based on stability"
fails to develop, the long term criteria imposing stability as the "standard of the monetary union" do not prevent withdrawal from the Community). The author relies here
on his own translation of the original German text of the opinion. 47 NJ.W. at 3056.
55. See Tomuschat, supra note 20, at 494-95 (discussing the possibility of withdrawing from the European Union); see also lpsen, supra note 20. at 16-17 (same).
56. G6tz, supra note 20, at 1085.
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CRITIQUE OF THE MAASTRICHT RULING

Politically, the Maastricht ruling is important because through it the
FCC opened the door for the German ratification of the Treaty on European Union. The FCC's argument, particularly its emphasis that European unity is not impaired by the German Basic Law, does not hinder further integration toward some kind of "United States of Europe"." From
a democratic point of view, one must welcome the statement of an authoritative legal body that further European integration is not possible
without the development of genuine democratic structures in the EU and
a suitable democratic environment in Europe. The goal of supranational

integration cannot support the failure to meet democratic standards in
the European community that have been regarded as indispensable on
national levels for a long time.
From a pro-integrationist angle, however, the judgment also has a
downside. By giving the Treaty an authentic interpretation to which the
European institutions must abide in order to avoid the risk that the FCC
will declare EU acts void for Germany, the FCC sets itself up as a
guardian of the constitutional framework of the EU. Even more than the
Court's persuasive interpretation of Article F(3) of the Maastricht Treaty,58 which is not explicitly entrusted to the ECJ either, because this

provision is not an amendment to the EEC Treaty,59 the FCC's authentic interpretation of the amended Article 1090) of the EEC Treaty pres-

57. See, e.g., id. at 1086 (referring to the possibility of expanding the European
Community concept); Herdegen, supra note 30, at 249 (noting that the opinion leaves
open the possibility of further integration beyond Maastricht); Ipsen, supra note 20, at
21 (stating that the opinion unequivocally lends itself toward the unlimited expansion
of the Union); Lenz, supra note 36, at 3039 (stating that the FCC opened the way
toward greater community integration); Schr6der, supra note 26, at 325 (same);
Tomuschat, supra note 20, at 496 (stating that the Basic Law already points toward
European integration in its preamble). But see Meessen, supra note 32, at 554 (noting
that some Member States may have reached their present limit on integration).
58. See Tomuschat, supra note 20, at 492 (noting that the Court's interpretation
of TEU Article F(3) is persuasive); see also Herdegen, supra note 30, at 245 (analyzing the Court's interpretation of TEU Article F(3), though noting that one of the
Court's arguments concerning this provision is "at least doubtful").
59. The EEC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty on European Union, does not
confer jurisdiction to the ECJ over the interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty itself,
but only over the amended EEC Treaty. TEU, supra note 3, art. L (extending the
ECJ's power to the interpretation of other specific provisions of the TEU among
which Art. F is not mentioned).
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ents an outright challenge to the ECJ.' Although the ECJ has no explicit power to interpret amendments of the EEC Treaty before they
enter into force, the ECI is the only institution that may interpret an
amendment with binding force thereafter. The FCC's attempt to impose,
at least indirectly, its reading of the provision on other nations 6' therefore collides with the ECJ's monopoly in authoritatively defining the
contents of the EEC Treaty. One might even argue that the ratio legis
of Article 177 of the Rome Treaty required the FCC to ask for a preliminary ruling of the ECI regarding the authentic interpretation of the
amended EEC Treaty as a basis for deciding whether the German ratification of the Maastricht Treaty violates the Basic Law. The FCC's
announcement that it will review acts of the EU to determine whether
they comply with the limits the FCC has given to the Treaty's interpretation is an overt statement that it will deny the ECJ's interpretative
monopoly on EC law even in the future. Even though the FCC's interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty is compelling in many respects, its
ruling reveals that the EU, as a supranational organization with own
rights, will continue to remain in a principal conflict with at least
Germany's national sovereignty.
From a political point of view, however, the Court's ruling may also
be regarded as a healthy warning against basing European integration to
a far extent on an extensive interpretation of the underlying treaties by
the ECJ, as has been done in the past. While European integration may
be supported by pro-integrationist ECJ rulings, the European peoples in
the last resort must decide how far and in which direction the integration should go. The architects of the EU often have forgotten this democratic imperative in the recent past. In Germany, for instance, there was
quite a discrepancy between the pro-European statements of the major
political parties and the popular mood, visible above all in the discussion about the European Monetary Union that proposes to replace the
Deutsche Mark with a European currency. Though the resistance of
many Germans to the idea of a European currency was motivated to a
large extent by irrational fears, the politicians have not, or at least not
sufficiently, responded to them. This lack of response may have politically motivated the FCC to address the question in its ruling.' Instead

60. See Hanf, supra note 32, at 417 (noting that the judgment reveals a profound
mistrust of the EC]).
61. Id.
62. See Herdegen, supra note 30, at 249 (regarding the proceedings before the
Court as a "substitute for a public debate on the monetary union before parliamentary
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of conducting the debate on the European Union through a judicial
body, it would have been more appropriate for the politicians to have
discussed the Treaty and its implications with the electorate. One may
like or dislike referenda as they took place in France and Denmark. In
Germany, where the politicians did not ask the electorate itself for a
popular vote on the Treaty, the lack of necessity to have to explain the
Treaty on European Union to the citizens certainly contributed to the
already existing public aversion against a bureaucratic system without
sufficient links to the people it serves.
Despite the FCC's attempt to make up for some of the shortcomings
in the democratic process toward European integration, it is highly debatable whether entering the third stage of the European Monetary Union, as the Court contends, touches the democratic essence of the German Basic Law. To date, monetary policy is already delegated to an
independent body, the German Central Bank, that is almost entirely detached from democratic control by the German Parliament. Notably, the
FCC justifies this type of delegation in Maastricht as a legitimate modification of the democratic principle tested both in the legal system and
scientifically.63
II. THE RULING ON THE OUT-OF-AREA
DEPLOYMENT OF GERMAN TROOPS
A. THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT
Unlike in the Maastricht case, the ruling on the out-of-area deployment of the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, does not have any
earlier court history. The motivation for this dispute between high federal organs (Organstreit), which the Social Democratic faction of the
Bundestag, the opposition party, and the liberal FDP faction, the junior
partner in the government coalition, initiated against the government,'

approval").
63. [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 104.
64. The petition of the FDP faction was only directed against the deployment of
German troops to survey and enforce the United Nations embargo against Serbia.
Even though the FDP did not try to hinder the deployment of troops in the government or in the Bundestag, it initiated a constitutional dispute in order to clarify the
legal qualification of those actions for the future. See Judgment of July 12, 1994,
1994 N.J.W. 2207, 2219 (dissenting opinion of Justices Bbckenfbrde and Kruis) (viewing the FDP action as inadmissible because the FDP did not try to use the Parliament to avoid this outcome and thus is barred from alleging that rights of the Parliament have been violated, and further commenting that a mere opinion from the FCC
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was exactly the lack of clarity in this field. Until Germany decided to
send German troops to support peace-keeping operations in Somalia and
the former Yugoslavia, Germany's political parties had uniformly agreed
not to deploy armed forces other than for defensive purposes.' The
ruling was expected to clarify whether Germany will be able to participate, without having to amend its Constitution, as an equal partner in
UN peace-keeping activities and in NATO and West European Union
(WEU) operations aimed at fulfilling respective UN Security Council
resolutions.'
B. THE REASONING OF THE COURT

The first question the Chamber answered is whether Article 24(2) of
the Basic Law,67 which permits Germany, "[w]ith a view to maintain-

on the constitutionality of the deployment of troops, as sought by the liberal faction.
is not a permissible action before the Court). The other six justices disregarded the
underlying political motives of the complaint before the Constitutional Court as irrelevant and found the action admissible. Id. at 2208.
65. See Burkhard Hirsch, Zur Entstehung des Art. 87 a HI GG, 1994 ZEtTSCHRWr
FOR RECHTSPOLrIrK [Z.R.P.] 120 (noting that ill previous governments of the German
Federal Republic, regardless of their political affiliation, uniformly agreed to deploy
troops of the Bundeswehr only for defensive purposes).
66. In two preliminary decisions, the Court had already considered two motions
seeking preliminary injunctions against the deployment of German military personnel
for NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) units to supervise the
UN no-fly order for Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the UNISOM II mission in Somalia.
Focusing on the question of whether Germany's reputation would be damaged more if
the Court would enjoin Germany from engaging in activities which might later be
held constitutional or abstain from issuing an injunction on activities that later might
be held unconstitutional, the FCC reached different decisions. Regarding the AWACS
mission, the Court, in a five to three ruling, decided that Germany's contribution of
more than 30% of the military personnel was important for the success of the mission, whereas the possible damage if the deployment turned out to be unconstitutional
would be insignificant. Judgment of April 8. 1993, 88 BverfGE 173. extracts in 1993
NJ.W. 1317, 1318. In the Somalia case, the Chamber by unanimous vote issued a
preliminary injunction requiring an assenting vote of the Bundestag before the deployment of German troops could be continued. Judgment of June 23, 1993, 89 BVerfGE
38, extracts in 1993 NJ.W. at 2038. The reasoning behind this decision was that,
without an injunction, the Bundestag's rights possibly could be foregone. The necessity of parliamentary approval, however, would not infringe overly upon the
Executive's rights should the final decision be that the deployment was a prerogative
of the government because the government generally is responsible to the Parliament
anyway. Id. at 2039.
67. GG, supra note 6, art. 24(2). Article 24(2) of the German Constitution states:
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ing peace," to enter into a "system of collective security," also permits
the deployment of German troops to the operations in Somalia and the
former Yugoslavia. With reference to the preparatory work of the
Grundgesetz, the eight justices unanimously held that the constitutional
authorization to enter into such a defensive system also constitutes the
basis for fulfilling the tasks "typically connected with such a system,"
such as the deployment of troops. Member States of systems of collective security have to be prepared to help safeguard and restore peace
even with military means.s Nevertheless, the Court did not regard
Germany's membership in a system of collective security as constituting
a transfer of sovereign rights to such a system. The integration of German troops into such an organization does not imply that the organization may exercise immediate sovereign rights within Germany.69 On the
other hand, it makes no difference to the Court whether the purpose of
the system is to guarantee peace among the Member States or to provide collective support to Member States against attacks from the outside. Thus, the Court qualifies both UN and NATO as collective security systems in the meaning of Article 24(2) of the Constitution. 0 The
FCC states that if the Bundestag has approved the accession to a system
of collective security, this assent also covers sending troops into integrated units of the system and putting German troops under the system's
command, as far as this is already implied by the charter or founding
treaty of that organization. 7 Although the Court unanimously held that
the UNISOM II operation in Somalia fell under the Bundestag's authorization through its law assenting the accession to the UN, only a five to
three majority of the Chamber believed that the transfer of operational
control for the action to the commander-in-chief of UNISOM II was
also covered by the legislative act of assent.7" In the unanimous opinion of the Chamber, the deployment of German troops in the framework

With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may become a party to a system
of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon
its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in
Europe and among the nations of the world.
68. 1994 N.J.W. 2207, 2208.
69. Id. at 2209.
70. Id. at 2209-10.
71. Id. at 2210.
72. Id. at 2210-19 (reporting the results of the votes in the Chamber). Although
the judgment indicates that only a five to three majority reached a decision on the
issue of transferring operational control, the Court's opinion does not indicate which
justices dissented nor the reasons for their dissent. Id.
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of NATO and WEU to enforce UN Security Council resolutions 713,
724 and 757 according to Chapter VII concerning the embargo against
the rest of Yugoslavia, and resolutions 781 and 816 to enforce a no-fly
zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, was compatible with Article 24(1) of the

Basic Law. 3 Seven of the eight justices also believed that the parliament-approved accession treaty to NATO covered the transfer of opera-

tional control to NATO command, even though in this case NATO
acted on behalf of the United Nations.74

It is surprising that Article 87(a)(2)" of the Basic Law was not a
major point of discussion for the Court. The systematic relationship
between this provision and Article 24(2) was the focal point of scholarly
discussions preceding the FCC decision.76 Brushing all scholarly discussion about the genesis of this article aside, the justices pronounced that

this provision, in any case, does not exclude the deployment of armed
forces in the framework of a system of mutual collective security." To
deal with this highly controversial question in three paragraphs of the
judgment seems a bit blunt. It is true, as the Court states, that Article

24(2) has been part of the Basic Law since it entered into force, where-

73. Id. at 2210-11.

74. Id. at 2211-19 (omitting which justice dissented and the reasons for his or
her dissent).
75. GG, supra note 6, art. 87(a)(2). Article 87(a)(2) of the German Constitution
provides that "[a]part from defence, the Armed Forces may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law." (emphasis added.)
76. See, e.g., Torsten Stein, Die verfassungsrechtliche Z tiLssigkeit einer
Beteiligung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland an Friedenstnippen der Vereinten
Nationen in RECHTLICHE ASPEKTE EINER BETEILIGUNG DER BUNDESREPUBUK
DEUTSCHLAND AN FRIEDENSTRUPPEN DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN 17 (J.A. Frowein &

T. Stein eds. 1990) (devoting majority of discussion to the scope of Article 87(a)(2)
and the relationship between articles 24(2) and 87(a)(2)); Biner K. W. Biihr,
Verfassungsmiifligkeit des Einsatzes der Bundeswehr im Ralunen der Vereinten

Nationen, 1994 Z.R.P. 97, 103 (noting that Art. 24(2) gives no helpful guidance for
the interpretation of Art. 87(a)(2); Hans-Georg Franzke, Art. 24 II GG als
Rechtsgrundlage fur den Aufleneinsatz der Bundeswehr?, 1992 NJ.W. 3075 (discussing

whether Article 24(2) provides express authorization for the deployment of German
troops as required under Article 87(a)(2)); Hirsch, supra note 65, at 120 (discussing
creation and scope of Article 87(a)(2)); Axel Hopfauf, Zir Entstehung des Art. 87 a
II GG, 1993 Z.RP. 321, 324 (analyzing relationship of Article 87(a)(2) to Article
24(2)); Martin Kriele, Nochinals: Atslandseinsdltze der Bundeswehr, 1994 Z.R.P. 97,

103 (discussing historical developments leading up to amendment of Article 87(a)(2);
Ulrich K. PreuB, Die Bundeswehr- Hausgut der Regienmg?. 1993 KRnscHE JUsTIZ

263, 267-72 (analyzing relationship of articles 87(a) and 24(2)).
77. 1994 NJ.W. 2207, 2211.
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as Article 87(2) was only created in 1968 with the so-called "Emergency Constitution" (Notstandsverfassung), when provisions regulating the
deployment of the Bundeswehr in domestic emergency situations amended the Basic Law. It also seems accurate that this article was not meant
to regulate the use of armed forces in the international field." Even if
the historical interpretation of the FCC is correct, it is questionable to
use this opinion easy-handedly for a teleological reduction and to ignore
the clear wording of the provision. At the time of the amendment, no

one considered the deployment of troops for purposes outside of the
NATO area. Underlying the whole discussion about the use of the
Bundeswehr in domestic emergency situations was the broad, but silent
consensus that armed forces abroad may only be used for defensive
purposes.79 Since the Federal Republic was not yet a member of the
UN at that time, and the Cold War made it impossible to think of UN
operations like those now in place in Somalia or the former Yugoslavia,
it seems more appropriate to interpret the words "except for defensive
purposes" literally and to ask if the deployment of troops for UN missions can be understood as defensive within the meaning of the Basic
Law. While it is doubtful the deployment of troops for UN missions
falls under the literal interpretation of the term "defensive,"8 the de-

78. Id. The inapplicability of Article 87(a)(2) to the regulation of German armed
forces outside of Germany, however, is not as clear as the Chamber declares. See,
e.g.,
Claus
Arndt,
Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an internationale
Bundeswehreinsiitze, 1994 N.J.W 2197, 2198 (noting that amended Article 87(a) raises
the threshold under which Germany can enter a system of collective security that
entails a duty for the deployment of military forces); Btihr, supra note 76, at 98
(noting that legislative history clearly illustrates the legislator's intent to have Article
87(a)(2) cover the deployment of German troops both inside and outside of Germany);
Hirsch, supra note 65, at 120 (stating that, even though a literal interpretation of
Article 87(a) may be considerably broader, the intent of the drafters of Article 87(a)
was not to authorize deployment of German forces outside of Germany); Hopfauf, su.
pra note 76, at 323-24 (noting arguments made by commentators and in parliamentary
debates on the applicability of Article 87(a) to the regulation of external as well as
internal deployment of German troops).
79. See Bfhr, supra note 76, at 100 (declaring that one could not imagine a
defense situation not involving an attack on the alliance); see also Hirsch, supra note
65 (mentioning broad consensus of previous governments of the Federal Republic of
Germany to limit deployment of troops solely for defensive purposes).
80. See Bihr, supra note 76, at 99 (stating that the participation of the
Bundeswehr in military UN missions is not covered by the term "defense"); see also
PreuB, supra note 76, at 266 (noting that while the term "defense" literally should
cover only situations of imminent or actual military attack on the territory of the
Federal Republic, the phrase should be understood in functional, not territorial terms
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ployment of troops for such purposes is not of an aggressive
character"' even though the deployment of troops in fulfillment of obligations entered into by accession to a system of mutual collective security is not explicitly permitted by Article 24(2)' as required under Article 87(a)(2). Nevertheless, the Court apparently chooses the easy way by
avoiding this discussion and leaving the interpretation of Article 87(a)(2)
open.!3 The justices commit a methodological error, however, by asserting that the general authorization to enter a system of mutual collective
security makes the specific norm of Article 87(a)(2), which requires an
explicit authorization for the deployment of troops, obsolete."
The issue dividing the Court into two equally strong parties is whether the activities of the Bundeswehr in the NATO/VEU operations in the
former Yugoslavia were still covered by the acts approving NATO and
WEU accession of the Federal Republic of Germany. The legal dispute
in the instant case concerns the interpretation of the first sentence of
Article 59(2) of the German Constitution, which requires that treaties
"regulat[ing]" Germany's "political relations" need parliamentary approval in the form of a federal act. The background of the legal controversy
is that NATO and WEU members, with the participation of the representatives of the German government, might have tacitly extended the
original purposes of these organizations, as laid down in the founding
treaties, when they agreed to use the NATO and WEU structures for
UN actions.

as the prevention of an actual or imminent attack on the system of collective security
under Article 24(2)).
81. See Kriele, supra note 76, at 104 (disregarding the non-aggressive character

of UN missions and insinuating that Blhr regards UN missions as aggressive because
they are not defensive).
82. See, e.g., Bahr,

supra note 76, at 101 (noting that it is questionable whether
the language of Article 24(2), through which the Federation consents to limitations on
its rights of sovereignty, meets the requirement of 87(a)(2) for an "explicit" constitutional mandate for the deployment of troops); Franzke, supra note 76, at 3076 (stating
that Article 24(2) only implicitly permits the deployment of troops outside of Germany, while Article 87(a)(2) requires that troops be deployed only "as explicitly permitted by this Basic Law"); Preu3, supra note 76, at 269 (stating that Article 24(2) does
not "explicitly" permit the deployment of troops).

83. 1994 NJ.W. 2207, 2211 ("No matter how one may answer this question . . .

").

84. Cf. PreuB, supra note 73, at 267 (arguing that in a state under the rule of
law one cannot infer from a legally formulated goal that the remedies for its achievement are implicitly offered).
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Justices Klein, GraBhof, Kirchhof, and Winter of the FCC adopted a
strict reading of this provision under which only a formal amendment of
an international treaty requires new parliamentary approval. These four
justices find international treaties to be open to "dynamic interpretation"
permitting their adaption to changing situations. In their opinion, such
"treaty law-making by authentic interpretation" (Fortbildung des
Vertragsrechts durch authentische Interpretation)is inherent in the preamble and the underlying goals of such treaties. According to them, the
interpretative rules of Article 31(1) and (2) of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties also support this viewpoint. When the Parliament
approves an international treaty, the justices argued, it knows the goals
and preamble of the treaty. Therefore, a dynamic interpretation is covered by this approval. 5 Even if the application of an existing treaty
attains legally binding importance for its interpretation and amounts to
an amendment of the treaty, the parliamentary authorization given
through the treaty-assenting act remains valid. The Parliament does not
have a right to require from the government the conclusion of a formal
amendment to the treaty. In the opinion of these four justices, this result
is a consequence of the balance of powers between the executive and
legislative branch according to the Basic Law.86
Pursuant to the third sentence of Article 15(3) of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz),a tied vote on matters involving an alleged violation of the Basic Law creates the presumption that there has been no constitutional infringement. Thus, the
vote of these four justices prevails over that of the other half of the
Court and supports the judgment.
The four "dissenting" Justices Limbach, B6ckenf6rde, Kruis, and
Sommer characterize the behavior of the Federal Government, such as
the repeated political declarations about the modified purposes of NATO
and WEU and the participation of the Bundeswehr in the actions in the
former Yugoslavia, as an "extension" of the original NATO and WEU
treaties which, though not yet legally qualified as a treaty amendment,
threatens to undermine the rights of the Parliament. They emphasize
that, according to their founding treaties, both organizations are defensive pacts. Peace-keeping measures for the United Nations in third countries have no basis in the text of the treaties and cannot be justified by
either the preambles or the underlying goals. Although Article 12 of the
NATO pact envisions future cooperation between NATO and the UN, it

85. 1994 NJ.W. 2207, 2212.
86. Id. at 2213.
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follows from the same provision that such an extension can only be the
result of a treaty revision, not an automatic adaption. According to the
four "dissenting" justices, the treaty parties do not have the power to
draw the line between authentic interpretations and treaty amendments.
Even if it were possible to modify essential parts of a treaty through
authentic interpretation, such a consensus for modification is subject to
parliamentary approval pursuant to Article 59 of the Basic Law." For
the "dissenting" justices, the necessity of securing parliamentary support
for the politically risky extension of alliance obligations at such an early
stage-prior to the conclusion of a formal amendment-is "self-evident"
in a parliamentary democracy.'
With respect to the participation of German troops under UN command in the operation UNISOM II in Somalia, seven of the FCC justices found that parliamentary approval was not necessary. By accepting
Germany's accession to the United Nations in 1973, the Chamber argues, the Parliament also gave the authorization for the Bundesivehr's
participation in peace-keeping missions of the UN.P
Even though the judgment in question does not place the Federal
Government under an obligation to seek parliamentary approval for a
modification of the strategic concept of NATO and WEU, the Court
holds that the Bundestag's approval of the deployment of German armed
forces was required for another reason. In adherence with the constitutional tradition since Weimar, the Constitutional Court construes an
implicit parliamentary proviso for the deployment of German troops.
Article 45(2) of the Constitution of the German Reich of 1919 (,Veimar
Constitution) required a parliamentary resolution for the declaration of
war and for a peace settlement. A similar parliamentary proviso was laid
down in the former Article 59(a) of the Basic Law, which was introduced when Germany founded the Bundeswehr. Although this provision
was repealed in 1968 as a number of provisions regulating the deployment of the Bundeswehr in emergency situations amended the Basic law,
the Chamber does not view this repeal as an intentional abolition of the
parliamentary proviso.' According to the FCC, the Bundestag's consent
to the deployment of troops usually must be attained in advance. Unless
the parliamentary organs have already declared a "state of defense"
(Verteidigungsfall), parliamentary approval is necessary even when the

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 2215.
Id. at 2216.
Id..
Id. at 2217.
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Federal Republic only complies with alliance obligations or when troops
are deployed on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions. Only in
the case of imminent danger may the federal government deploy armed
forces without prior parliamentary consent. The federal government,
however, must seek parliamentary approval immediately and must withdraw the troops if the Parliament so requires." The proviso does not
give the Parliament a right of initiative in this matter, although it is up
to the Bundestag to decide how it wants to exercise its participation
right regarding the deployment of troops. The Court insinuates a parliamentary procedure that differentiates according to the type of deployment contemplated, namely the degree to which the deployment is already anticipated by a program of military integration laid down in a
treaty." Since the Federal Government did not seek parliamentary approval, which the Bundestag can give by a simple majority, the Court
concluded that the deployment of Bundeswehr units in Somalia and the
former Yugoslavia violated the German Constitution.93
C.

CRITIQUE OF THE "OuT-oF-AREA" JUDGMENT

Although the FCC found that the German government's decision to
deploy troops without asking for prior parliamentary approval was a
violation of the Basic Law, in the end the ruling is favorable for the
Federal Government. The most important outcome is that the deployment of the Bundeswehr for UN peace-keeping operations, be it in the
framework of NATO or WEU or under UN command, does not require
a constitutional amendment. The probability that the government will
attain such approval if it considers the deployment of armed forces is
considerably higher in a parliamentary system like Germany than in a
presidential system like the United States. The German government can
usually rely on a stable majority in the Parliament, although this majority has shrunken considerably in the last federal elections. Parliamentary disapproval of a military engagement that the government favored
would in most cases equal a no-confidence vote. Thus, the ruling should
enable the government in the future to order the deployment of German
troops for peace-keeping purposes without the consent of the opposition.
Such consent would have been necessary for the two-thirds majority
required for a constitutional amendment. The Court, however, does not

91. Id. at 2218.
92. Id. at 2218-19.
93. Id. at 2219.
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even discuss in detail the apparent need to amend the Grundgesetz as a
prerequisite for the out-of area deployment of German troops?'
The majority's interpretation of the approval requirement under Article
59(2) of the Basic Law is legally not compelling. The Parliament is
denied important participation rights in foreign affairs through a formalistic reading of this provision. The statement that the Court's opinion
furthers the constitutionally-mandated balance of powers in foreign affairs is a mere petitio principii rather than a determination based on a
thorough investigation of the ratio legis. In view of the many ways in
which governments now can create legally binding international obligations, the prevailing justices give the Executive a carte blanche to exclude the parliamentary representatives from influencing important matters of foreign policy, as long as the Executive does not choose to act
by concluding an international treaty. 6 With the same formalistic interpretation used by the Court in this case, one would have been able to
undermine provisions embodied in many earlier Constitutions that required parliamentary approval for the declaration of war. The government would have had only to wage an undeclared war to be safe. As
demonstrated by the fact that wars after World War I were usually
undeclared wars, international behavior sometimes changes substantially.
In order not to become worthless paper, a living Constitution must be
able to adapt to those changes. This requires a dynamic interpretation of
its text. The four justices whose votes support the judgment, however,
deny their own Constitution the dynamic interpretation they grant, in the
same judgment, to the NATO and WEU treaties.

94. See Arndt, supra note 78, at 2198 (criticizing the Court for acting like a
legislator in amending the Constitution by disregarding the real meaning of Article
87(a)(2)).

95. The Court's Pershing II decision illustrates the highly questionable method of
drawing conclusions from the vague principle of division of powers embodied in
Article 20(2) of the Basic Law for the interpretation of provisions specifically regulating the division of powers. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1984, 68 BVerfGE 1, translated in
1 FEDERAL CONSTITUONAL COURT, DECISIONS OF THE BuNDEsvEIFAssLuNGsGERicHT

511 (1992) [hereinafter DECISIONS]. Justice Mahrenholz convincingly rebuts this argument as follows: "Art. 59(2) Basic Law is itself a means of making positive the
Basic Law's principle of division of powers. The scope of this principle can therefore

not be determined by some ideally imagined schema of division of powers."
536, 547 (dissenting opinion).
96. Id. at 546 (dissenting opinion of Justice Mahrenholz) (stating that
meaning of Art. 59(2) Basic Law would be missed were the Executive able to
on the scope of the reservation as to enactment by choosing the legal form
declaration").

Id. at
"[t]he
decide
of its
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Politically, the ruling clarifies the participation of German troops in
UN missions and also allows Germany to participate in NATO and
WEU operations bound to fulfill UN Security Council resolutions. Although the Court does not explicitly address the question of whether UN
operations must be under UN chief command or whether the UN, as
was the case in the Gulf War, may merely authorize actions, it seems a
misreading of the judgment to assume that the latter case is not covered
by the Court's statement that the accession to the UN encompasses military peace-keeping measures according to Article 42 of the UN Charter.97 The FCC, therefore, seems to remove the obstacles standing in
the way of Germany attaining a more important role in world politics,
such as Germany's claim for a permanent seat in the UN Security
Council.
What may be regarded as a positive outcome from an international
perspective, however, might be less so from a German domestic view
because the ruling dispenses the government from seeking a national
consensus on Germany's future role in the international community, as
would have been necessary had a constitutional amendment been required. It remains indeed somewhat strange that in a situation where all
major political parties have already presented their proposals for a constitutional amendment to settle the problem," the FCC virtually ended
this constitutional debate."
CONCLUSION
With the exception of one member,"° the composition of the FCC's

97. 1994 NJ.W. 2207, 2210. But see Arndt, supra note 78, at 2199 (finding that
only UN operations under UN chief command are permitted by the Court because the
form of authorization to some states has been developed outside the UN Charter).
Arndt, however, neglects to realize both that this seems to be a recognized UN practice now and that the FCC is willing to permit a dynamic treaty interpretation. But
see Klaus Dau, 1994 NEuE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WEHRRECHT 177, 181 (stating that if
this opinion were correct, the Court would have mentioned this in connection with the
peace-keeping mission in the AWACS case because NATO exercised operational control in this case and not the UN).
98. See Preufl, supra note 76, at 272-76 (discussing the different political proposals).
99. See Dau, supra note 97, at 182 (remarking that the decision of the Court has
made obsolete, in a not entirely unproblematic way, the still missing political consensus on the issue).
100. The term of Justice Mahrenholz, the Vice President of the FCC and the
Presiding Justice over the Second Chamber, ended before the Court delivered the
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Second Chamber remained the same in both cases. At the core of both
rulings lies the question of where the borderline between the democratic
rights of the Parliament and the transfer of sovereign rights to international bodies falls. It is discernible that the "dissenters" in the second
case follow a strict line in defining the rights of the Parliament, a line
that is consistent with the Maastricht ruling. On the other hand, there is
an evident dissonance between the Court's reasoning in the Maastricht
ruling and the prevailing justices' opinion in the decision on out-of-area
deployment of German troops. While the Maastricht judgment draws a
fine line between the parliamentary act approving a treaty and the authentic interpretation of that treaty, the four justices supporting the
judgment in the "out-of area" case seem to have forgotten the Court's
earlier reasoning. They do not explain their sudden change of opinion.
Such an explanation would have been essential since the four prevailing
justices paradoxically give an international organization like the EU,
which has an emerging, though not yet sufficiently, democratic structure
and a court entitled to interpret its treaty, less of a democratic reputation
under a dynamic interpretation of its founding document than governmental organizations like NATO and WEU under a modified "authentic"
interpretation on much looser textual ground of their founding treaties.
The justices do not even consider whether such law-making through
modified treaty interpretation might conflict with the democratic principle of the German Basic Law.
Such a double standard in the judgment on European integration, on
the one side, and on international military/security cooperation, on the
other side, has been evident before. In the Eurocontrol decision of 1981,
the Second Chamber ruled that the future development of an international organization must be laid down with sufficient certainty in the founding document on which the national act of accession is based. The original parliamentary assent does not cover essential modifications of the
integration program.'' Two years later, when the same chamber had to
decide on the constitutionality of the installation of NATO Pershing Hl
and cruise missiles medium-range weapons in Germany, it found that
parliamentary approval of such deployment was not required. The Court

second judgment. He was replaced by Justice Jutta Limbach, who now presides over
the Second Chamber and is the first woman to be appointed President of the Federal

Constitutional Court. In this function, Limbach is the successor of Roman Herzog,
who was elected President of the Federal Republic of Germany.
101. Judgment of June 23, 1981, 58 BVerfGE 1, 37, translated in 1 DEcisIONS,
supra note 95, at 37.
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argued, for instance, that the special dynamics of defense require broadly formulated defense treaties that are adaptable to new situations,'
Justice Mahrenholz, in his dissenting opinion in the Pershing case, denounced the Court's double standard in European integration and defense matters.' 3
It is not too speculative to say that the attitudes of the prevailing four
justices in the out-of-area decision, which are hardly compatible with the
Maastricht ruling, also have their source in an end/means approach.
Apparently, the overwhelming support for Germany's integration in
NATO and the UN has caused the justices to disregard whether their
legal reasoning in support of such goal is at variance with their reasoning in other cases. Certainly, this is not the way constitutional court
justices should act. Rather, it is a way to discredit their institution in the
long run.
One can hypothesize as to the consequences of future Court decisions
in foreign policy matters. Presumably, the FCC will not very soon be
concerned again with the question of out-of-area missions by German
troops because the out-of-area case provided the landmark decision on
this subject. At some point in the near future, however, the FCC may
be asked to decide whether acts of the EU are in compliance with the
reasoning of the Maastricht decision. Such a case could come to the
Court through different procedural ways." It is doubtful whether the
Court will then be as lenient with parliamentary and democratic rights in
matters of national sovereignty as in the out-of-area case since the much
stricter Maastricht ruling was unanimous. Even in the unlikely case that
the prevailing justices in the out-of-area ruling should feel urged to
harmonize their opinion with their reasoning in the judgment on the
Treaty on European Union, it seems even less likely that all four justices will leave their stricter "sovereignty line" in European affairs.

102. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1984, 1 DECISIONS, supra note 95, at 527-28.
103. Id. at 540 ("The constitutional content of Article 24(1) Basic Law has well
nigh evaporated under the pressure of an end/means relationship: not the Constitution,
but the object of the Treaty, is to decide how open provisions ought to be that are
to serve as the empowerment basis for the transfer of sovereign powers.").
104. For example, such a case could come before the Court by way of an individual constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) at the time Germany should
enter the third phase of the Monetary Union, by a dispute between high federal organs (Organstreitigkeit) or even by an abstract judicial review (abstrakte
Normenkontrolle) initiated by a state government (Landesregierung).

